Next Commission will start with its authority damaged

Whoever becomes president of the European Commission, he or she will take possession of a bruised institution.

The struggle between the European Council and the European Parliament over which of them nominates the Commission president has had the entirely predictable effect of weakening the independence of the Commission.

The successor to José Manuel Barroso will owe his or her existence to the other institutions. That much is written into the Lisbon treaty – which ordains that the appointment needs the consent of both institutions. What matters, however, is how far, and for how long, once the process of appointment is complete, the president is constrained. The manner by which the appointment is being arrived at risks tying the hands of the new president to the extent that it may not make much difference who is appointed.

The drive to set “priorities” for the European Union could make sense. In the right hands (Herman Van Rompuy’s) it could forge some consensus and bring greater coherence to EU policymaking. But a programme of priorities could also be misused, whether by national governments or MEPs, to dictate to the European Commission what it does (or does not do) and when.

Amid the storm of rumour and speculation, briefing and counter-briefing, about the preparations for next week’s European Council meeting, there are some disturbing elements. One is that support for a presidential candidate is being made directly conditional on agreement to relax the EU’s macro-economic surveillance. That comes dangerously close to eroding the credibility of the Commission, which is bound by the EU treaties to enforce EU law, as any kind of enforcer.

Another disturbing element is the suggestion that some member states are trying to exact – as a price for their consent to the Commission presidency nomination – compensation in the form of appointments to the senior ranks of the Commission staff. Haggling over the nomination of commissioners is one thing, but haggling over the appointment of directors-general should be excluded. Barroso himself set an appalling precedent here. In 2009, he announced, as he made Michel Barnier the European commissioner for single market and services, that he was minded to appoint Jonathan Faull to be director-general for the internal market – to balance the appointment of a Frenchman with that of a Briton.

A Commission in which not just the European commissioners but also the directors-general are allocated their responsibilities on the basis of their nationality, as part of the same grand bargain, will be a weak Commission. Although the Commission is already making senior appointments with an eye to achieving some “geographical balance”, if this goes further, if senior managers are perceived to be appointed primarily on the basis of nationality rather than merit, then the Commission will not command respect externally. Additionally, the senior managers will not command respect from their own staff. A deterioration in performance will be the probable consequence.

The incoming president must resist threats and blandishments, whether from national administrations or from MEPs. Ground given at this stage will not easily be recovered later. Equally, the European Council must resist the temptation to include extraneous baubles of patronage in its agreement on a Commission president. There is little point in appointing a president, while at the same time draining power away from the institution over which he or she is to preside.